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I.
Today I want to talk about the question, "What's so special about
American law?" And let me begin by saying something about why this is
a question worth asking.
I have two reasons for being interested in this question. The first is a

matter of practical pedagogy. Every year I teach an introductory course in
American law to a class of foreign students, most of whom are already
practicing attorneys back home. So they know what a court is and how to
read a statute and how to draft a contract; but beyond those generalities
there is surprisingly little we can take for granted. Obviously, if you are
going to say anything worthwhile to people like that, you need some idea
of what is special about American law, and what sets it apart from law back
home-otherwise you will just end up telling them what they already know.
So I looked into the books published in Europe and designed to explain
the American legal system to European lawyers. The standard texts all take
a "legal families" approach. That is, they say the world divides into five or
six legal families-for example, Islamic law, Hindu law, and, most

*
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inexorably, the Common Law Family and the Civil Law Family. The
American system is then slotted into the Common Law Family, whose
defining characteristic is said to be that it rests on a system of precedent,
whereas the Civil Law Family rests on codified l aw. And the result of this
way of thinking is, you get a lot of books with titles like "An Introduction
to

the Anglo-American Legal System."
Now, at first glance there should be something strange about a phrase

1 ike "the Anglo-American legal system," or with a scheme of taxonomy that
lumps together the United States and Zimbabwe and Hong Kong in one
basket, and France, Japan, and Brazil in another. In fact there are lots of
things that confuse or outrage foreign students in an LL. M. program-but
they are almost never bothered by the distinction between codified law and
precedent.
This observation is already enough to prompt the question in my title.
But there are other reasons for being interested in it as well. We hear every
day about globalization, about how business is becoming increasingly
international, about how the Europeans, in order to compete, are adopting
a common currency and harmonizing their legal systems. It is normal to
wonder how American law fits into this trend and how far this process of
international harmonization is likely to go. Should we expect other legal
systems to Americanize their law? Or should we expect to have to
Europeanize our own legal system? Would either of these developments be
a good thing? And how difficult would harmonization be to carry out in
practice?-But clearly if you are to have any hope of answering important
questions like these, you need first to have an answer to the question, What
is distinctive about American law? What, if anything, sets it apart from law
in the rest of the world? And then, lurking behind these practical questions
are a bunch of questions of legal theory, such as, What is the relation
between law and society? What is the role of history and economics,
ideology and culture, the legal tradition and social norms in giving shape to
a modern legal system, and in distinguishing one legal system from
another?
Surprisingly little has been written on this topic by comparative
lawyers; and in this lecture I'll try to do two things: first, to persuade you
that the standard answers to the question that one commonly hears are
basically inadequate. (To say that they are inadequate is not of course to
say that they are wrong-just that they don't do as good a job as one would
like). About this negative part of the argument I am fairly confident. B u t
then I'll also try t o sketch a positive answer of m y own: And here I am
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much less confident that I have gotten things right. So my suggestions about
how to answer the question, What is so special about the An1erican legal
system, are extremely tentative and provisional. But ifi can persuade you
that the question is worthwh ile and that the answer is much more
complicated than it seems at first glance, that is perhaps enough progress
for an hour.
Before turning to the question itself, a few clarifications may be in
order.
First, in looking for what is distinctive about American law, it will be
helpful if we distinguish between deep differences and superficial
differences. To say that a difference is superficial is not to say that it is not
important; and superficial differences can even come as a surprise. For
example, many American lavvyers are surprised when they learn that
contingent fees are illegal in most of the world outside the United States.
This is clearly an important fact for a lawyer to know; but it is not a deep
fact in the sense in which I am using the word. For the fact about contingent
fees, by itself, has no profound conceptual or systematic implications about
the legal system; and as soon as one is told this fact, one immediately can
figure out the reasoning that underlies it.
Now, it might be that all the differences between, say, the American
and the French legal system are superficial differences like the difference
over contingent fees. In that case, comparing the two systems would be a
bit like comparing two fairly similar automobiles, one made by Ford and
the other by Buick. What you have is thousands of little differences in the
individual parts-but no deep underlying difference of principle, unlike, for
example, the difference between a car and a refrigerator. ..if that is the sort
of way in which the French and the American legal systems are
distinguished, then the best we can do is simply to list the thousands of little
differences-which would be a boring intellectual exercise (though it might
also suggest that the harmonization of the two systems at least would not
have to overcome some deep underlining difference of principle).
But for this e nterprise we are looking for deep differences-first,
because that is the path of conceptual simplicity; and secondly, because the
deep, unstated, and far-reaching assumptions are likeliest to cause
confusion and to present an obstacle to harmonization.
A second preliminary point. In looking for the differences between
legal systems, I do not mean to imply that there is necessarily some unique
way of clarifYing and grouping together various legal systems. For some
purposes American law may be closer to Swedish law than either is to
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Canadian law, and for other purposes not. (Tn fact, to give you an important
example that I'll say something about later: It seems to me that American
constitutional law is closer to German constitutional law than either is to
British or French constitutional law.)
Third, it is important to distinguish my question about the American
legal system from the wider debate about what is called "American
exceptionalism." There is an extensive sociological literature on what
makes America different, going back at least as far as Tocqueville. This
literature considers such questions as: Why, in contrast to every European
country, has there never been a powerfu l socialist movement in the United
States? Why does American society have a much higher rate of violent
crime than other Western societies? Why is the rate of religious observance
higher? And the sociologists have pointed to a lot of other features of
American life to explain these things-the absence in America of a feudal
past, the ready availability of land on the Western frontier, democracy and
individualism and ethical diversity, the Constitution, and the Protestant
work ethic, for example.
Now, there is a complicated relationship between the sociologists'
question, "What makes America different?" and my question, "What makes
American law different?" Some aspects of American law-the Constitution,
democracy, equality, and freedom of speech and religion-plainly stand in
a complicated relationship to American society. It is of course a highly
controversial question whether law shapes society, or society shapes law,
or both, or neither. I wish here to set aside such worries as far as possible
and just compare the American legal system to other legal systems-but
recognizing that in the end the more complicated sociological questions will
have to be addressed.
So let us now turn to the question, "What's so special about American
law?"
II.
As I just explained, the most familiar answer to this question is that, at
least to a first approximation, American law belongs to the common-law
family of legal systems, while much of the rest of the world follows either
the civil law or some other legal tradition. This way of dividing up the
world into various legal "families" or legal traditions has a distinguished
pedigree, and goes back at least as far as Rene David's path-breaking
scholarship. It is the standard account in the literature, and some authors go
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so far as to speak of the "Anglo-American Legal System" as a designation
for the common law.
But once we have drawn the boundary line in this way, we now need
to explain exactly what distinguishes the common law from the other legal
traditions, and most especially from the civil law. And here the explanations
fall into several classes.
The first and the most familiar explains the difference as follows. In the
civil law countries law is based on a written code, laid down by the
legislature, whereas in the common law it is based on precedents, handed
down by judges. Now, T do not deny that there is some truth to this
observation; but I do deny that it is an adequate answer to our main
question.
In the first place, much of American law is codified either by statutes
or by administrative regulations. The contrast applies with full strength only
to the private law of tort, contract, and property-important areas to be
sure, but not the whole of law. Second, even within those areas of private
law, some common-law jurisdictions have reduced their contract law to a
legislative code without in the process ceasing to be common-law
jurisdictions: California offers the clearest example, but one can also think
of those numerous jurisdictions that have enacted the Uniform Commercial
Code. Third, the reliance of common-lawjudges on blackletter treatises and
on Restatements is not in practice very different from the reliance of a
continental judge on the Civil Code. The basic rules of contract and tort and
property are well understood throughout the Western world, and have an
authoritative written statement in both systems: The mere fact of legislative
enactment makes little difference to the typical litigant. Fourth, codification
is in fact a comparatively recent phenomenon in the civil law systems. The
earliest code, the Napoleonic Code, is less than two hundred years old; and
most of the countries of central Europe did not acquire a civil code until the
start of the twentieth century. Basically, throughout the Western world one
sees a common pattern of development. Chaotic and customary rules about
land and promises and injuries were analyzed and reduced to order in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and then were given a canonical
formulation either in a civil code or in a treatise or in a Restatement.
For all these reasons, then, the mere presence or absence of a civil code
is hardly the most striking difference between law in America and law in
the rest of the world.
So let us turn to a second way of drawing the distinction between the
civil law and the common law. According to this second theory, it is not the
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civil code, but the use of judicial precedents that distinguishes the common
law from the civil law. Once again, there is some truth to this theory; but
once again, it is inadequate to answer our main question. The truth is that
in a country like France, for example, judges are not legally bound by the
doctrine of stare decisis in either its horizontal or its vertical form. That is,
a court is only obligated to follow the Code. It is not obligated to follow its
own precedents in an earlier case-the horizontal aspect of stare dec isis.
Even more surprisingly, a lower court is not obligated to follow the view of
the law held by a superior court-even if the superior court has remanded
a case back down to the lower court for decision.
But once again it is important not to exaggerate the difference in
attitude toward precedent. I n the first place, when a European court has
announced its opinion on a particular matter of law, typically it will stick to
the same opinion in later cases for all the obvious reasons. Secondly, lower
courts will typically follow the opinions of higher courts, both to avoid the
embarrassment and extra work caused by a reversal, and because in many
jurisdictions their chances of promotion suffer if they are reversed too many
times. For all these reasons, then, despite the official dogma, the behavior
of civil law courts in the past is a reliable guide to how they will behave in
the future. (And in fact, in some countries such as Germany some law
professors in some law schools have begun to teach law using the case
method.)
None of this is to deny that there is a difference in official dogma about
the binding force of precedent, or to deny that the difference is important.
But in practical terms this is not a difference that causes much confusion to
foreigners when they come to study Law in the United States, and it does
not mark a deep point of distinction setting apart the United States from the
rest of the world.
And there is a subtler reason why precedent does not play this role. It
is often said that the common law evolved historically in England as judge
made law, announced by the courts of the King. It is easy to slide from this
truth into the assumption that the common law has always rested on
precedent, and that the main task of common lawyers has always been to
locate and cite previous judicial opinions. But in fact even in England there
was no regular system for reporting opinions until nearly half a century
after the American Revolution. Before that time, lawyers in England and in
America relied on Blackstone; and before Blackstone the situation was even
more chaotic. (Blackstone's views on precedent, by the way, are quite
subtle. His view is not that the law is simply to be identified with the totality
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of past judicial decisions. Rather, the law is something more abstract,
implicit in the customs and immemorial practices of Englishmen; and the
job of the courts is to discover what the law is. Past opinions are evidence
of what the law is, but for Blackstone they are not the law itself.) In other
words, the common law's reliance on judicial precedent is a relatively
recent artifact: yet another reason for not treating precedent as the crucial
point of division between America and the rest of the world.
Let me briefly sum up where we are. I am t1ying to answer the question,
"What's so special about American Law?" As a first approximation, I am
considering the standard answer: "America is different because it is a
Common-Law system." But when we asked, "What's so special about the
Common Law?," the first two answers we came up with-it does not have
a c ivil code, and it relies on precedents-turned out not to be terribly
distinctive after all.
So let us try a third approach. Some scholars have sought to explain the
difference historically as follows.
In the high middle ages, around the end of the eleventh century, two
events occurred that caused English and Continental Law to pursue
divergent paths. The first event was the Norman conquest of England in

1066, followed by the consolidation of political power throughout the
kingdom in the hands of a central monarchy. Law in England was
administered in the courts of the King, and was pronounced by judges in his
name: a degree of central control that existed nowhere else in Europe.
The second event was the recovery around 1100, in Italy, of the written
text of classical Roman Law, the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Emperor
Justinian. This text was recovered just when the political leaders of the
middle ages were seeking to consolidate their power and to improve the
authority and sophistication of their legal systems. The Corpus Juris gave
them exactly what they needed: a highly sophisticated body of legal rules,
far more carefully worked out than anything else available, and enjoying all
the prestige and authority of the Roman Empire. The texts of the Corpus
Juris were quickly copied to be studied in universities throughout Europe,
and they became the object of learned scholarly research, for the next
several centuries, at the hands of the Glossators and Post-Giossators and
Commentators. It was this law-the law of ancient Rome, as interpreted by
medieval scholars and taught in the universities-that provided the
foundation for the civil law legal systems.
According to this story, the crucial difference between England and the
Continent arises from these two events-the Norman conquest, on the one
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hand, and the influence of Roman law on the other. On the Continent, law
was developed by university professors; in England, it was developed by
judges. And for this reason (the story goes), even today a judge in the
common-law world is more highly regarded, is a figure of greater weight,
than is a judge in the civil law; whereas for legal academics the ranking is
reversed. And there are other differences that this account does a good job
of describing. In the civil law, the development of law was a matter of
interpreting an authoritative text, whereas in the common law it was a
matter of deciding concrete cases. Where the common law represented "law
in action," the civil law represented "law in books." The civil law was
handed down in advance by the sovereign, while the common law had to be
made up case-by-case. So the civil law developed from the top down, while
the common law developed from the bottom up. And these differences in
turn had other far-reaching consequences. The civil law, being laid out in
advance,

was more susceptible to careful logical analysis

and

to

presentation as a coherent, abstract system, while the common law had a
more chaotic structure, and looked more to the solution of concrete
problems than to the construction of grand general principles.
These contrasts between the civil law and the common law are familiar,
as are their further implications for the system of legal education and for the
courts and for scholarship. And as an explanation for the differences
between English law and Continental law, this historical explanation in
terms of Roman law is far better and goes far more to the root of the matter
than the explanation in terms of the civil code or in terms of precedent.
But still I do not believe that this explanation is good enough to answer
our main question. I have three reasons, First, this explanation overstates
the extent to which law in the middle ages on the Continent was directly
inherited from Rome. Even if we leave aside the law merchant and feudal
law and the law of the church (which included most of family law and
contract law), what the medieval lawyer studied was not simply Roman law,
but Roman law as interpreted by the Scholastics. The difference is crucial,
for the entire abstract apparatus of Continental European law is a product
of the medieval universities-and the relevant abstract categories and
concepts were as influential in England as they were on the Continent.
Secondly, the suggested explanation overlooks the way in which ideas
about systematization and formalization of private law operated both in
England and on the Continent, so that the codification movement was a
pan-European movement, including such English figures as Bentham and
Austin at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Maitland and Pollock
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at the end. Third, the Roman law explanation overstates the extent to which
all modern legal systems have been influenced by the conditions of m odem,
industrial mass society. Contract law and tort law in their modern forms
scarcely existed two hundred years ago; and the Napoleonic Code famously
devotes only five short provisions to the law of torts. The industrial
revolution and the increasing number of accidents changed all that,
everywhere in the Western world, and in ways that are only loosely related
to Roman law. So the Roman law explanation seems to me not to work
either.
Let's try a fourth approach. So far we have been focusing on legal
rules-the blackletter substance of the law, and how it is presented. Perhaps
we should focus instead on institutions, and on how particular actors within
the legal system perform their jobs-legislators and scholars, lawyers and
judges, administrators and juries, for example. Perhaps this is where the
dividing line between the common law and the civil law is to be found.
And with the mention of the jury we are certainly on to something
important, because there is no jury in civil cases on the Continent (and even
in criminal cases it functions differently than in the common law). But let
us stick with civil cases. In contrast to codes or precedent or even Roman
law, this is a huge difference, and it affects almost every aspect of the
administration of civil justice. Without a jury you do not need formal rules
of evidence, you do not need elaborate procedures of pretrial discovery,
indeed, you do not need a trial at all in the usual sense, but rather what the
Continentals call a process-a series of arguments before a judge that can
stretch on for months or years. And without a jury to act as fact-finder,
there is no reason why an appeals court cannot review questions of fact as
well as questions of law.
There are immense differences, but focusing on the civil jury as the
principal dividing line has some strange consequences. Remember that we
were searching for a dividing line between the civil law and the common
law. But in fact the jury in civil cases, although it is still central to American
law, no longer exists in England (except in an insignificant range of cases).
In other words, of the proposed differences between legal systems we have
so far considered, the most significant turns out not to divide the common
law from the civil law, but America from everybody else: The border is not
where we expected it to be.
This is a significant fact, and it will be worth our while to step back and
consider it. So far we have seen the inadequacy of various theories to
account in a satisfying way for the differences between various modem
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legal systems. And the root of ail the inadequacies is the same. The
distinction between the common law and the civil lmv systems, whether you
try to explain it in terms of codes or precedents or the historical influence
of the Corpus Juris, is always, in essence, a distinction between two bodies
of private lmv rules. And it is easy to see hmv this particu Jar distinction
could have come to loom so large in the scholarly legal consciousness.
When the subject of comparative law first emerged in the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth, it did so when the codification
movement was in full swing, and indeed

the original purpose of

comparative law was in large part to help legislators with the task of
codification. In these circumstances it was naturai for comparative lawyers
to lay great emphasis on codes and the rules of private law, and thus to
elevate the differences between England and the Continent into a difference
between two "legal families"-the "common law" and the "civil law."
I do not mean to deny that there are important distinctions here, both
historical and theoretical. But as I said at the beginning, there may be more
than one way of dividing up the legal world, and the traditional division of
the world into common-law systems and civil-law systems may be for our
purposes neither the most fruitful nor the most illuminating.
So let us now return to the civil jury. This does mark a very real
distinction between American law on the one hand, and European law,
including English law, on the other. But we cannot let the analysis stop
here. For the continued existence of the civil jury in America, although it
is an important difference, is in a certain sense not a deep difference of the
sort I am searching for. So far all we have said is that America has the civil
jury, and eve1ybody else doesn't. But surely the question we need to answer
goes much deeper than this. Why have the Americans kept the civil jury,
while the English have abandoned it?
We need to make a fresh start.
As I said a few moments ago, the standard explanations all focus on the
civil codes, that is, on the substantive rules of private law. It is significant
that the one point of divergence we have found-the jury-belongs in
essence to the procedural law, and thus is generically close to public law.
Moreover, the jury is not a body of rules at all, but an institution, and this
suggests that we might look at the functioning of other institutions, such as
legislatures and judges, law firms and scholars, for clues to the distinctive
features of American law.
Plainly there are a Jot of threads to disentangle here. Since time is short,
Jet me focus on the strand of public law.
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Certainly one distinctive feature of the American legal system is its
reliance on a written constitution. This is an important fact, but it is one that
needs to be treated with some care. In the first place, most legal systems in
the developed world today rely on a written constitution. What is
immediately different about the American Constitution is its age-a fact
which raises the question, \Vhy was the American Constitution the first?
Were there any distinctive features ofiaw in America that led the Founders
to adopt a written constitution? And whatever those features were, they
must have diverged from the mother country, because Great Britain today
is the only European nation without a written constitution. (In other words,
what matters here is not the existence of a written constitution, but the role
it plays within the overall system of American law. Is there anything
distinctive, then, about the way we use our Constitution?)
Here an obvious answer suggests itself. The American legal system
makes heavy use of judicial review. This is certainly an important fact, and
sets the United States apart from countries such as Britain and France. In
both of those countries (although this is changing under the impact of the
European Union) the Parliament is supreme, and the courts have no
authority to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional.
But this theory is unsatisfactory as well, for two reasons. First, although
it distinguishes the United States from Britain and from France, it does not
work nearly so well for the rest of Europe. In particular, the German
Constitution sets up a special constitutional court whose sole purpose is to
decide questions of constitutionality, and which has broad powers to strike
down acts of the Legislature. The constitutional experience of other
countries (such as Italy and Austria) has been similar. Secondly, and more
subtly, there is a problem of historical timing with this explanation.
Remember what it is that we are trying to explain. We want to explain why
the Americans were the first to adopt a written constitution (even though
Britain did not); and we want to explain what features of American
constitutionalism set it apart. But however powerful a force judicial review
has been in the twentieth century, it was used only sparingly prior to the
Civil War, and it is of course not mentioned at all in the Constitution itself.
I am assuming that American law in 1830 was already quite different from
European law; but if this is so, judicial review did not cause the divergence.
In other words, important though judicial review undoubtedly is, it is itself
one of the phenomena that we need to explain.
Let us pause to see where we are. I have been looking for an answer to
the question, "What is so special about American law?" The standard
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approach in the treatises of comparative law-the "legal families"
approach-says that the world is to be divided up into the civil-law family
and the common-law family, and that American law is a species of common
law. But when we looked at this answer more closely we found that it broke
down in two ways. First, even when we confined our attention to codes and
precedents and the mechanics of private law adjudication, we found that the
differences between the two families were less deep or surprising than is
commonly supposed: Whatever may distinguish American law from the rest
of the world, it is not the fact that American judges generally follow
precedent cases. Secondly, as soon as we looked away from private law we
found several far more significant differences between the leading legal
systems of the Western world-for instance, the civil jury, written
constitutions, and judicial review. And this list could easily be extended.
But more importantly, once we descend to this level of detail, the
differences between the principal systems do not seem to correlate in any
interesting way to the distinction between the civil law and the common
law. The dividing lines not only do not match up, but cut across each other
in every possible way. This is an important point, so let's consider some
examples. On some issues, such as federalism or gun control or the death
penalty, the United States is on one side and all the European legal systems
on the other. On judicial review, Germany and the United States are on one
side, Britain and France on the other. Britain has a monarchy, an established
Church, and a House of Lords; France, Germany, and America do not.
Germany has a constitutional guarantee of a social welfare state; France,
Britain, and America do not.
This list could easily be continued, but it is already long enough to let
us draw an important negative conclusion. The standard taxonomy that
divides the world into common-law systems and civil-law systems, however
natural it may have seemed to comparative lawyers at the end of the
nineteenth century, is no longer a useful tool of analysis. It obscures rather
than illuminates what is truly distinctive about various legal systems, and
it is an obstacle rather than a help in answering our principal question.
This is so far only a negative result, though an extremely important one.
There are a good number of books purporting to introduce foreign law
students to "the Anglo-American legal system"; but if my argument is
correct, there does not exist any such system any more than there exists an
Anglo-Italian system or a Franco-American one.
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I I I.
This negative conclusion leaves us with a puzzle about how to proceed.
We still have to face the question, "What is so special about American
law?" What deep aspects of the American legal system are most likely to
cause confusion to a foreigner, and how are they best to be explained?
This question requires a positive answer, and it looks as though there
are two ways we might proceed. The first would be simply to throw up our
hands and acquiesce in the conclusion that there are a great number of
variables that separate one legal system from another and that these
variables are independent of one another. So we would explain the
American

legal

system

essentially by pointing to

a list

of these

variables-judicial review, civil juries, federalism, the death penalty,
contingent fees, separation of church and state, the Electoral College, and
so on-but not try to find any sort of hidden unity behind this list. And it
may in fact be true that there is no such hidden unity to be found-that
there are no "deep" differences between legal systems, but only an
accumulation of surface differences, and that looking for a deep, underlying
distinction between the machinery of American law and French law is, as

I said earlier, like looking for a deep, underlying difference between a Ford
and a Buick.
Now this conclusion, if it is correct, would have important implications
for legal theory and for questions about the evolution of law, the nature of
legal transplants, the relative weight to be given to legal ideas as opposed
to legal rules, and the prospects for harmonizing two distinct legal systems;
and it may be that, in fact, this is the best we can do. These are complicated
_
questions and I have no time to pursue them here, or to explain why, as a
matter of legal theory, this pessimistic conclusion seems to me unlikely to
be true.
Let me instead pursue the second course, which is to continue the
search for deep differences between legal systems, independent of the old
distinction between civil law and common law.
It will be a good idea to start by getting a firmer grasp on the question
to be answered. I said earlier that in fact foreign law students are rarely
puzzled by the American system of case law. So what does puzzle them?
It is not hard to make a list: Here are some examples.
The civil jury I have already mentioned-and the fact that it leads to a
complex and unfamiliar set of rules about pretrial discovery as well as to a
set of rules of evidence law and to complex interactions between judge and
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jury. The entire system of federal courts, and the interactions between the
state and federal judicial systems, are almost uniquely an American
phenomenon: The only real parallel (and it is not very close) is the
interaction between the European Court of Justice and the legal systems of
the European member states. The death penalty is found nowhere in
Europe. Nor is the American system of plea bargaining. Nor are contingent
fees for lawyers. I f we turn to legal scholarship, intellectual movements
such as law and economics or critical race theory have no real counterparts.
Perhaps most startling of all is the American practice of electing judges and
prosecutors, and of allowing them to run what is in effect a political
campaign, complete with campaign contributions and the support of a
political party.
I t is phenomena like these, and not the mere citation of cases as
precedents, that cause the most surprise to foreign lawyers studying the
American legal system for the first time. I t can be downright embarrassing
to try to explain to them a case like BA1W v. Gore, 1 in which an Alabama
jury gave eight million dollars in punitive damages because BMW had
repaired a scratch on his new car. I n no other legal system in the civilized
world can an unsupervised jury impose what is in effect a criminal penalty
without any of the normal protections of criminal procedure, from the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the prohibition against
arbitrary or excessive criminal sanctions that have not been clearly
specified in advance. And then try to explain that the judge faced re
election by the voters of Alabama, and that a large slice of the eight million
dollars went to the lawyers, who were working on a contingent fee! In most
of the rest of the world these facts would be viewed as incompatible with
the rule of law and would be strictly illegal. And the situation is even worse
when you try to explain how a criminal defendant facing the death penalty
could be tried by an unsupervised jury, a prosecutor who is running for
public office, a judge who is up for re-election, and a bored and underpaid
public defender.
My goal is not to condemn these features of the American legal system,
or to defend them, but to understand why they exist in America and
virtually nowhere else. Is there some common thread that unites them, some
common explanation for their existence?
I think there is, and it goes something like this.

I.

517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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When you listen to an American and a European lawyer talk about a
case like BJv!W it is striking how often the argument will end up sounding
like this. On the one hand, the American \VOuld say that, yes, the jury award
in that case was excessive. But Americans trust juries and the good sense
of the people, and the occasional BMW case is a small price to pay for a
democratic society that allows the direct participation of the people in the
legal process. And similarly for the election of judges and prosecutors.
These, just like a governor or a senator, are exercising a political power in
the name of the people, and so it is important that they, too, be held
democratically accountable at regular elections. On the other hand, the
European is likely to say that yes, it is indeed important to keep the power
of the state under control, but that the American system does so in an
unprofessional manner and rnns the risk of turning a trial away from the
impartial administration of justice and into a species of mob rule.
With this debate I think we are close to an extensively fundamental
distinction between the European and the American ways of thinking about
their legal systems. It is important to notice that the terms and categories
employed by both sides are subtly different. The American appeal is to the
people, to direct democracy, and to electoral accountability: Notions like
the state and professionalization play a distinctly secondary role, though
they are primary for the European.
As I said, this fact seems to me a deep and fundamental point of
difference. The American legal system, to a greater extent than any other
Western legal system, encourages the direct injection of democratic values
into the legal process. Our legal system, like our society, places great
emphasis on the value of equality. We do not fully trust professional elites.
In France and Germany judges receive special professional training and are
promoted up through the ranks of a bureaucratic hierarchy where they are
comparatively insulated from party politics. In America, judges receive no
specialjudicial training and are often deeply involved in party politics. The
American system values equality. We distrust hierarchies, we distrust big
government, and for the same reasons we distrust elites. In contrast to any
European country we place a greater faith in individual rights and freedoms,
and in a deregulated market economy. These are deep tendencies in
American legal thought, and it seems to me that they underlie the various
phenomena I mentioned earlier that so surprise foreign lawyers: the
populism of our jury system; the political involvement of judges and
prosecutors and pub!ic defenders; the phenomena of ambulance chasers and
contingent fees and the relatively unprofessional nature of the American
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law; the attractiveness of free-market theories of law and economics; the
openly political nature of judicial review and of our process of appointing
justices to the Supreme Court; even such phenomena as the popularity of
the death penalty or of critical race theory or of plea bargaining-all of
these things are best seen in light of the deeply political nature of the
American legal system, its commitment to egali tarian and democratic
values, and its broadly based populism. To repeat the main claim of my
talk: I t is these phenomena that constitute the deepest and most distinctive
features of the American legal system and that make it so special, and it i s
these phenomena w e need to explain, and not the relatively trivial fact that
American judges sometimes rely on precedents when foreign judges rely
on a c ivil code.
But to say this is not yet to solve the problem, only to identify it. How
are we to account for these differences? How did they arise, and how are
they to be justified?
It might be thought that some deep characteristics of American society
are in play here, and that the sociological literature on American
exceptionalism might provide us with an answer. But I fear this avenue will
not carry us very far. The sociological literature on this matter seems to
divide into two types. One type points to the social or economic structure,
and observes that American legal institutions grew up against the backdrop
of a wide-open frontier, or that America never had feudalism or a hereditary
aristocracy. But countries like Australia or Canada or Russia have had
frontiers; and institutions like feudalism or aristocracy are themselves legal
institutions of precisely the sort we need to explain. The other type of
sociological account is more ideological and consists in pointing out that the
"American creed" is committed to equality, democracy, populism, free
market economics, liberty, and pluralism. But if you then ask the
sociologists why Americans are committed to these things, their answers
typically point to the Constitution or some other feature of the legal system.
So we just end up traveling in a circle, and indeed are likely to end with the
suspicion that the exceptional features of American society are to be
explained in terms of the exceptional features of American law rather than
vice vers a.
So where does that leave us? If my argument so far has been right, we
can draw two conclusions: first, that there are a large number of significant
differences between American law and Jaw everywhere else, and second,
that those differences seem to cluster around certain ideological aspects of
the American legal system.
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As I said at the beginning, I am not exactly sure how the analysis goes
from here. But let me close by giving you a quick sketch of the beginnings
of an account of where the principal differences come from.
Very roughly, it is important to remember that the modem European
states are all, in one way or another, the heirs of the monarchies of the late
middle ages. The kings and queens of early modern

E urope had

consolidated power in the hands of a unitary system of administrators and
judges, all answering directly to the monarch. In the days of Louis XIV and
the early Stuarts, of Bodin and Hobbes and Filmer, the legal thinkers of the
t ime analyzed the legal system in terms of sovereignty and its close relative,
the state. Every state, on this classical account, contains a single, absolute
sovereign, who is the source of all law, whom all his subjects obey, but who
h imself is not bound by the laws he hands down. The roots of this
conception go well back into the middle ages and all the way to Roman law.
But for our purposes the important point to remember is that, at the time of
the French and American Revolutions, when the modem Western legal
systems were being created, the central organizing concept of European
legal thought was the idea of the state, the inheritor of the powers of the old
monarchies. When the k ings were abolished or their powers limited, the
state was still the central and most conspicuous aspect of political life. It
was there, in all its power: And the central question of European political
theory was, how do we control it? How do we limit its awesome power?
And the answer they gave went something I ike this. In the modem state,
it is essential to separate the powers of the legislature from the powers of
the executive. The legislature is the representative of the will of the People;
but it is constrained to pass general laws of prospective application that will
be applied by an independent bureaucracy to the entire population,
including the legislators themselves. The executive bureaucracy is to take
these general rules and see that they are impartially and mechanically
applied. To guarantee against corruption, the bureaucracy must be
independent of improper political influences. That is,

it must be a

professional, specially trained civil service, with security of tenure, whose
loyalty is not to the government, but to something quite different: the state.
This conception of an independent, professional, state bureaucracy is of
course an elitist conception. The civil service, on this view, needs to be
isolated from the forces of populist politics and needs to be specially
educated to perform its tasks. And it is not hard to see the parallels between
this ideal of a state bureaucracy and the European ideal of a judge. The
judge, too, is to be an imparti al administrator of justice, professionally
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trained, and owing loyalty t o the state rather than t o the government. The
task of the judge is impartially and mechanically to apply the general r u l es
laid down by the legislature in its statutes an d in the Civil code : I t is to b e
a

kin d of highly sophisticated and professional techn ician , but not an

independent force for political change.
But in A merica the devel opment was very different. We, too, in 1 7 8 7 ,
faced the central problem of limiting and contro lling the exerc i se of
political power. But our theoretical framework was n ot at all the same. The
British monarchy had never had as fi rm a grip on the American colonies as
it had in England itself. A n d at the time of the Constitutional Convention
there simply did not exist in America anything like a European state.
Instead we had thirteen separate states-and it is a striking fact that even
today the American legal system does not emp loy the concept of the stale
as an analytical legal category at all: We talk instead of the government.
And the American solution to the problem of political power was different
too. W e do not rely on an elite bureaucracy or professionalization to control
a cen tralized state. I nstead, we break up power both horizontally (with the
separation of powers) and vertically (between the federal and the state
governments). And we rely throughout on a grass-roots conception of
popular sovereignty, on the direct, democratic participation of the people,
entrusting them with wide discretion to elect judges or sit on civil juries,
just as they participate actively in the political process.
(It is for this reason, I think, that Europeans react so strongly to a case
like BMW. They view it as an almost incomprehensible delegation of state
power to the free discretion of unprofessional lay jurors. For them, this
looks like a subversion of one of the basic principles of the rule of law-a
surrender of the awesome power of the state to a kind of populist mob
justice. But if one were to propose to an American lawyer the abolition of
civil juries, and the consolidation of judicial power in the hands of a
professional class of mandarins insulated from democratic political
accountability, you would run up against a very different tradition of legal
thought.)
It seems to me that the deepest differences between the American and
the European legal systems are all linked, i n one way o r another, to these
two different ways of thinking about the state and popular democracy. The
American system of federalism, our continued use of the civil jury, the
election of judges, the discretion to award punitive damages, the distrust of
professional elites, are all, I think, heavily influenced by this deep,
underlying difference.

'.
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A s I s a i d a t the begin n i n g, I a m n o t sure about h o w t h e deta i l s of th i s
argument are to be worked out from here . A !l I have tried to do in th i s taik
i s address th e question, "What i s so special about A m erican l aw?" And I
h ave made two c l a i m s .
First, th at t h e stan dard answers given i n the standard textbooks o f
comparative l a w do n ot work . Wh atever i s m ost distinctive a b o u t A m e rican

l mv i s n o t a m atter o f c iv i l codes or j ud i c ia l precedents or the ru l e s o f
Rom an private l aw . Second, that there are some surpri s i ng an d d is t inctive
features of th e A m erican l egal syste m that set it apart i n i n teresting ways
fro m other Western l egal syste m s , and that these features appear to b e
l i n ked, i n comp l ex an d s u b t l e ways, t o certai n d e e p tra its i n the way
A m e ricans and Europeans th i n k about the control of state power, and that
those sty l e s of thought go back to what an earl i e r Q u i n l an l ecturer, B e rn ard
B a i lyn, s ig n ificantly called the ideological o r i g i n s o f the A m e r i can
Rev o l uti o n . I h ave not tri e d h e re to exp lore a l l the deta i l s, which is a task
that wou l d take us d e e p ly i n to legal theory and i n to A m erican and European
l egal h istory . B u t I h o p e at l east to h ave p e rsuad ed you of the importance
o f th e questi o n , " What is so .special about the A merican legal system?" and
of h ow m uc h m ore d ifficult this question is to answer than seem s at first
glance.

